The value turn in epistemology generated a particularly influential new position -virtue epistemology. It is an increasingly influential epistemological normative approach that opts for the intellectual virtues of the epistemic agent, rather than the truth-value of the proposition, as the central epistemic value. In the first part of this article we will attempt to briefly explain the value turn and outline the basic aspects of virtue epistemology, underlining the diversity of epistemic attitudes associated with this approach and their positive impact on expanding epistemological horizons. The second part will be focused on the virtues of epistemic responsibility and epistemic justice as particularly appropriate for evaluating social cognitive processes such as, for example, testimony and general communication/conversation.
Introduction
Truth has been traditionally considered the fundamental and principal epistemic value and goal, analogously to the role of good/right in ethics, the significance of justice in political philosophy or of beauty in aesthetics. However, increasingly intense debates regarding epistemic values and intellectual virtues within the last two decades have resulted in the introduction of plural epistemic goals and virtues as an alternative to the traditional value monism of truth (Kvanvig 2005, Haddock, Millar and Pritchard 2009) Discussions regarding epistemic values are partially related to different understandings of epistemology as a philosophical discipline and of the scope of its research topics. If epistemology is narrowly understood as a theory of knowledge, then it is natural to define the truth-value of beliefs as the fundamental epistemic goal and limit the role of the epistemologist to defining the conditions of justification and conceptually analyzing knowledge in general (David 2001) . However, if we define the goal of epistemology as an inquiry into the very process of acquiring knowledge -into different ways of forming beliefs, distinct cognitive products such as assumptions and working hypotheses, doxastic attitudes such as trust or belief revision, and various kinds of cognitive accomplishments such as attributing meaning to empirical data and finding solutions to problems -then it is possible to propose different epistemic values. Following the latter understanding of epistemology, its central aim becomes not only to define and determine the conditions of knowledge, but to critically assess the cognitive processes of making decisions and acquiring beliefs, the doxastic attitudes of evaluating, retaining or revising beliefs, and the influence of society on epistemic processes and their outcomes 2 . Successful acquisition of knowledge does not necessarily need to be evaluated in terms of true beliefs, but can rather strive towards adjusting beliefs to experience, achieving coherence with evidence and empirical adequacy, promoting understanding, nurturing theoretical wisdom, producing rational assumptions and promising working hypotheses, or at conducting epistemically responsible research (Kvanvig 2005 (Kvanvig , 2010 It is possible to simultaneously accept the list of epistemic values suggested by Jonathan Kvanvig and to consider truth the only, ultimate and primary epistemic goal, as long as we 2 Such an understanding of epistemology coincides with Locke's original definition of epistemology as the study of the possibility of attaining true beliefs, the processes of cognition and the scope of knowledge (Locke, 1690. ). An extensive account of epistemology that acknowledges the epistemic properties of social processes and institutions is, for example, also fully accepted by Alvin Goldman (Goldman 2010 ).
However, this article does not aim to side with either monists (reductionists) or pluralists in the discussion regarding epistemic values, nor does it strive to analyze the assets of different pluralistic approaches, such as the pluralism of additional values or the pluralism of intrinsic epistemic values. Our key goal is, above all, to emphasize the possibility, significance and necessity of broadening our understanding of epistemology to include its analyses of widely understood doxastic states, cognitive processes, acts and events. Secondly, we aim to demonstrate that such an extensive approach requires a broader definition of cognitive success and clearer relations between specific epistemic values and cognitive activities. The final goal of this article is to show how this extensive approach aids the epistemic evaluation of cognitive processes and intellectual activities (such as, for example, communicative acts between patients and psychiatrists), which would otherwise be exempt from epistemic inquiries. Finally, it is crucial to realize that this approach improves the epistemic value of cognitive activities and results in more effective solutions to problems.
Virtue epistemology
The numerous strikingly different epistemological positions which are currently developing under the auspices of virtue epistemology -despite their divergent definitions of virtue and attitudes towards the epistemic relevance of certain issues -all share two fundamental stances. The first stance is the basic thesis of traditional epistemology (and especially emphasized within standard analytical epistemology) which defines epistemology as a normative discipline. Thus, in focusing on the normative aspect of epistemic evaluation, 14 . Given that virtue epistemologists often find points of agreement or manage to reach compromise, it is particularly important not to regard these distinctions as rigid or final. For example, it is possible to argue that the epistemic responsibility of an agent is a personal disposition that responsibly leads towards truth (Greco 1999) or that justification and 9 This makes it clearly evident that virtue epistemology is analogous to virtue ethics in focusing on agency and assessing the achievements of the individual (in this case, epistemic) agent with the aim of encouraging (in this case, intellectual) fulfillment. Moreover, authors like Linda Zagzebski emphasize the significance of this analogy in the context of their neo-Aristotelian approach to epistemology. See more in Zagzebski 1996 ., 2003a ., 2003b ., or in Brady and Pritchard 2003 For more information, see Greco 2011 . 11 Sosa 1980 ., 1991 Goldman 2002.; Greco 1992 ., 1999 ., 2011 . 12 Zagzebski 1996 ., 2003a Code 1987.; Fricker 2007.; Montmarqet 1992 Montmarqet ., 1993 Roberts and Wood 2007 . 13 Sosa 1980 ., 2007a ., 2007b Zagzebski 1996 ., 2003a ., 2003b . 14 Kvanvig 2003 ., 2005 Riggs 1998 Riggs ., 2002 Riggs ., 2006 Riggs ., 2009 Fricker 2007. knowledge are states attained by practicing intellectual virtues such as wisdom (Zagzebski 1996) .
For the purposes of this article, we will focus on the epistemologists who highlight the virtue of epistemic responsibility, regardless of whether it is perceived as a condition of intellectual development or a means of attaining the epistemic goals of truth or justification.
Irrespectively of whether epistemic responsibility is understood as a personal disposition or a However, agents do not need to consciously accept these stereotypes as true because the manifestation of social power (related to belonging to a certain collective identity) fully operates on the level of imagined social identities. If a stereotype about a certain group identity (women, African-Americans, the poor, the mentally ill or like) embodies a negative prejudice towards the speaker (for example, the perception of women as irrational, AfricanAmerican as lazy, the poor as incompetent, the depressed as unreliable, or like), the listener 15 Standard analytical epistemology mainly dealt with questions of the reliability of individual cognitive processes such as observation, reasoning, memory and like. Social epistemology, which has been intensively developing within the analytical approach in the last two decades, is becoming increasingly receptive to the epistemic evaluation of beliefs, social practices, institutions and even systems (such as, for example, the epistemic justification of democracy). See Goldman 2010. Miranda Fricker thematically belongs to the field of social epistemology. 16 As suggested by Michael Foucault, power appears on a purely structural level when it is so thoroughly dispersed through the social system that no particular agent is needed to embody it. In such situations, people act only mere "mediators" of power. For more information, see Dreyfus and Rabinov, 1982. underestimates the speaker's credibility and their their ability as an epistemic agent. This subjects the speaker to epistemic testimonial injustice. For example, someone can (consciously or unconsciously) underestimate the competence of women, the honesty of the poor, the credibility of the mentally ill, or like, and thus affect the course of their lives.
Another form of epistemic injustice, hermeneutic injustice, occurs when an important feature of an individual's social experience is exempt from socially imagined concepts and, consequentially, from collective understanding. Hermeneutic injustice occurs in all situations in which an epistemic agent, due to society's inability to understand them, incorrectly interprets their own experience. For example, a person with a history of mental illness can perceive themselves as unsuitable for a particular job due to the stereotype that dismisses them as a chronically maladjusted and incompetent individual. The continuous practice of this social injustice results in persistent and all-encompassing hermeneutical marginalization of such individuals.
As previously emphasized, both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice have a practical effect on the "victim" of injustice by depriving them of epistemic self-confidence and socially disabling them from becoming who they might have been had they not been subject to such injustice. Within a psychiatric/psychotherapeutic communicative act, the virtuous nature of epistemic justice lies in the necessity of nurturing understanding and encouraging the feeling of epistemic self-confidence which contributes to successfully solving the patient's problem. We will proceed to explain why we argue that epistemic justice is one of the key epistemic values in the communicative act of psychiatry/psychotherapy.
Philosophy of psychiatry and epistemic justice
Instead of limiting it to the acts conducted by a licensed psychotherapist, this paper broadly understands the term «psychotherapy» as a communicative act carried out by psychiatrists, clinical psychologists and psychotherapists with the aim of resolving/easing the mental suffering of their patient. Likewise, the role of the psychotherapist in a communicative act can be carried out by a psychiatrist, a psychologist or a psychotherapist. The aim of the communicative act initiated by the patient is not (or is not primarily) to attain true information from the patient or to establish a true diagnosis, but to resolve the patient's mental suffering.
Namely, this communicative activity is exempt from traditional testimonial forms, which are aimed at providing the psychiatrist/psychotherapist with true information, in being a certain testimonial «pathology» that strives to resolve the patient's problem through dialogue 17 .
However, despite entailing «pathological» qualities inherent to similar cases of testimonial «pathology», this communicative act has numerous epistemological features, such as the assessment of the speaker's credibility and the justification of trust, reflecting on one's own fallibility, nurturing understanding, and like, which can and should be appropriately The «harmfulness» and «dangerousness» associated with mental disorders are often reducible to their detrimental effect on perceived social security -much like Fricker's imaginary social concepts which are based on stereotypes -rather than being a reflection of the actual state of affairs. Jonathan Glover wonders whether an allegedly objective mental disorder such as autism is truly a disorder or a neural anomaly, whether anti-social behavior is a disorder or crude amorality, and whether addictions are mental illnesses or moral failures (Glover 2014 ).
Bolton explicitly concludes that a mental health professional should not exclusively aim to establish a true diagnosis, but to respond to the patient's articulated problem and their desire to receive help.
Following these discussions in the philosophy of psychiatry, it may seem as if psychiatric communicative acts can only be perceived as a certain epistemological "pathology" under the assumption that all epistemic acts have the solitary goal of reaching truth. However, we have shown how, in the light of recent scientific discussions, the value turn inherent to virtue epistemology provides us with a theoretical and normative framework of approaching this act by evaluating its epistemic properties (with the aim of improving the epistemic properties of the communicative act and its impact on the patient's well-being). We will proceed to elaborate the implications of epistemically evaluating communicative act in psychotherapy.
The psychotherapeutic communicative act potentially caters to both aforementioned kinds of epistemic injustice -testimonial and hermeneutic injustice.
Psychotherapy places testimony in a very specific social setting. The psychotherapist and the patient undertake the roles of both the speaker and the listener, perceiving each other in a particular social context. However, the epistemic responsibility of the psychotherapist necessitates them to be both a reliable source of information and interpretation (making them In psychiatry/psychotherapy, the role of common imaginative concepts is assumed by widely accepted psychiatric/psychotherapeutic theories that attempt to explain a patient's behavior by using pre-defined psychopathological explanations and classifications. The common imaginative concepts of these theories define, for example, the behaviors associated with neuroses, phobias, anxiety and depression, and describe the broadly understood position of the patient within a psychotherapeutic encounter. In short, the epistemic responsibility of the psychotherapist requires their sensible approach to pre-defined norms and interpretations, and a reflexive attitude aimed at avoiding the stereotypes and prejudices which may hinder the correct perception of their patient's credibility. Due to their possibly detrimental influence on the speaker/patient, it is extremely important to raise awareness about the common areas of epistemic injustice within a psychotherapeutic communicative act. As a specific type of epistemic injustice that is necessarily based on prejudice, testimonial injustice harms the speaker as an epistemic agent 20 . Any stereotypical interpretation and categorization of a patient can be a result of prejudice: the listener (in our case, the psychotherapist) may disregard their patient's testimonies as the irrelevant and confounding musings of a person undergoing mental suffering. The patient is then treated as cognitively unreliable in a way that excludes their interpretations from epistemic consideration by rejecting them as irrelevant pathological symptoms or approaching them with distrust.
One of the fundamental causes of epistemic injustice is the prejudice that the patient is inherently incapable of understanding themselves. This early assumption that the patient can only be properly understood by a psychotherapist is widely accepted in, for example, By contrast, an epistemically just psychotherapist subjects the client's testimony to epistemic consideration and accepts it as epistemically authoritative. Testimonial injustice can only be avoided through the neutralization of prejudices about the patient's unreliability. 20 Fricker distinguishes the concept of "innocent mistakes" for which the agent is neither ethically, nor epistemically culpable. These are the cases of unfortunate epistemic mistakes when the listener simply falsely assesses the speaker's reliability. Given that, in these cases, stereotypes and prejudice play no role in assessing the speaker's realibility, Fricker doesn't treat innocent mistakes as examples of testimonal injustice. (Fricker, 2007) . 21 While this originated as the fundamental idea underlying psychoanalysis, many psychotherapeutic theories, such as psychodynamic and transactional analysis, have later assumed the idea that a psychotherapist is an expert in understanding their patient. Freud's theory of psychoanalysis, for example, treats interpretation as a mere instrument of informing the client about their personal features which they are inherently incapable of grasping (Freud 1915) . 22 In short, all situations in which an epistemic agent is underestimated as a reliable source of information due to having characteristics that incite social prejudice, can be regarded as examples of epistemic injustice in psychotherapy. One such example is the experience of a patient who sought a psychiatrist following a suicide attempt. The patient was born without the final knuckles on four of her fingers (partial syndication). Musically gifted and persistent, she completed a musical academy as a piano player. Her attempt to convey this information to her psychiatrist made him consider her psychotic and consequently misdiagnose her. All of the patients' subsequent attempts to explain that she really was a piano player were unsuccessful and considered as further proof of her psychosis. 
Hermeneutical approach to psychotherapy
There are various criteria for differentiating psychotherapeutic approaches. This paper stresses the criterion of differentiating psychotherapeutic approaches proposed by
Hakam Al-Shawi (Al-Shawi 2006), He distinguishes the standard psychotherapeutic approach, the cognitive-behavioral approach and the hermeneutical approach to psychotherapy. The standard psychotherapeutic approach includes all psychotherapeutic practices that are equipped with a comprehensive theory and aim to provide the patient with insights into their mental states. While the cognitive-behavioral approach does not perceive insight as a curative method, it is also founded on a theory that provides a unified methodology of finding solutions to problems. The hermeneutical approach to psychotherapy, on the other hand, equips the psychotherapist with knowledge necessary for properly understanding the patient and perceiving them as a unique individual. However, there are significant differences to the dominant perceptions of psychotherapy inherent to individual 23 Fricker encourages the union of intellectual and moral virtues within the concept of hybrid virtues. It should be noted that there is a moral dimension the act of trust. Having an epistemically valuable attitude towards a speaker implies a moral stance of appreciation, so perceiving a speaker as honest and reliable promotes a sense of trust. In other words, a sensible and reflexive attitude towards one's own prejudice, or those produced by different psychotherapeutic approaches, should be considered both an epistemically and a morally valuable stance (Fricker, 2007.) .
psychotherapists or psychotherapeutic doctrines. For example, psychotherapeutic literature includes numerous psychoanalytically oriented authors who have accepted a hermeneutic approach to defining and understanding the psychotherapeutic process 24 . We will therefore not limit ourselves to particular psychotherapeutic approaches or doctrines, but will instead emphasize the distinction between two radically different, and even contradictory, approaches to practical psychotherapy: namely, the objectivist and the hermeneutical approach.
Research has shown that therapeutic effectiveness is not produced by the psychotherapeutic theory itself, but by the development of mutual understanding between the therapist and their client. Explorations and meta-analyses of the success rates of different approaches to psychotherapy have shown that the common features of effective therapy surpass the frameworks defined by particular doctrines, methods and techniques, and thus cannot be reduced to the implementation of procedures related to a certain psychotherapeutic school (Lambert, Hansen, Umphress, et al. 1996, Lambert and Barley, 2002) Regardless of the variety of factors and numerous different perceptions of their importance in effective psychotherapy, all research accentuates the critical role of the relationship between the therapist and their patient. More recent research has further diminished the importance of particular psychotherapeutic methods; the specific type of psychotherapeutic approach warrants for only 1% of the efficacy of the psychotherapeutic process; instead underlining factors such as jointly defined goals, empathy, therapeutic connection, positive affirmations, congruence and the character of the therapist (Laska, Gurman, Wampold, 2014) . In their works, Messer and Wampold (Messer and Wampold 2002.) conclude that shared factors ultimately prevail over specific methodological procedures in ensuring effective psychotherapy (Wampold 2001) . The ratio of variability related to shared factors such as the placebo effect, productive relationships, therapeutic connections and the competence of the therapist far surpasses the variance entailed by specific methodological components. Research also suggests that all psychotherapeutic approaches share the factor of mutual understanding between the therapist and their patient (Tracey et al., 2003) .
In psychotherapy, understanding is developed through a hermeneutical process of being receptive to new modes of interpretation in order not to succumb to outmoded patterns of understanding or harmful assumptions. While assumptions often lead to misunderstandings and false impressions, psychotherapy aims to provide both the therapist and the patient with knowledge unavailable to them prior to the therapy. The hermeneutical approach to psychotherapy considers every psychotherapeutic encounter a hermeneutical act, treating interpretations as means of fulfilling therapeutic goals, rather than as objective accounts of the patient's condition. Namely, a therapeutic approach that postulates psychotherapeutic theories as objective knowledge entails the implicit epistemology of perceiving subjective interpretations as true claims about the patient's mental state.
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Despite receiving the education of a psychoanalyst, Storolow is a proponent of the hermeneutical approach to psychotherapy, who has repeatedly shown that the concepts of a neutral (or objective) psychotherapeutic act and an objectively grounded therapist are unsustainable. He has argued for replacing the ideal of an analytical therapist with the concept that a therapist ought to focus on, as far as possible, opening, illuminating and transforming the patient's subjective world. It is entirely commonsensical that a therapist cannot avoid using interpretations as a legitimate method of understanding their patient's experience and advancing towards therapeutic aims. However, these interpretations must strive to facilitate mutual understanding instead of attempting to explain the patient's experience by subjecting it to a presumably appropriate theoretical framework. Therefore, Storolow suggests that the principle of a neutral therapist should be reformulated to describe a therapist who directs their interventions to opening, illuminating and transforming the patient's subjective world (Storolow, Brandshaft, Atwood 1987.) This request could be defined as a demand for the usage of the hermeneutical approach to psychotherapy, correctly recognized by Storolow as a beneficial contribution to the effectiveness of the psychotherapeutic process.
This implies that effective psychotherapeutic practice is not the product of a potentially counter-productive objectivistic approach, but of a hermeneutical approach which caters to the development of understanding between the therapist and their patient, thereby increasing the likelihood of accomplishing all relevant psychotherapeutic aims.
The psychotherapeutic encounter as an epistemic situation of testimony
The definition of a communicative act generally includes both verbal and written statements, as well as non-verbal communicative cues such as nodding or shaking one's head, waving one's hand, or like. In order for an exchange between agents to be classified as a communicative act, it ought to involve an exchange of information. Regardless of what definition we may choose to rely on, and the complexity of the chosen definition, we might agree with the claim that every psychotherapeutic encounter involves the deliberate transfer of beliefs between two people -a therapist and their patient (Ibid, according to Pritchard, 2004.) .
It is crucial to note that, within a psychotherapeutic communicative act, testimonies do not lead to truth understood as the formation of true beliefs or the acquisition of knowledge about the world. As previously mentioned, communication that qualifies as a testimony ought to meet the condition of enabling the listener to form true beliefs. It is emphasized that these beliefs must satisfy the epistemic condition of truth. As we have already argued, the aim of a psychotherapeutic communicative act that is initiated by the patient is not (or is not primarily)
to equip the patient/therapist with true information or to define a true diagnosis, but to resolve the patient's mental suffering and reach subjectively defined therapeutic aims. Namely, the specificity of this communicative activity lies in its deviation from the traditional testimonial 26 Certain information can be attained through an individual's perception, e.g. information about the vocal tone of a singer.
aim of equipping the therapist with true confessions or providing the patient with a true account of external reality, but to ease the patient's suffering. Psychotherapy could thus be understood as a certain deviation from the usual understanding of testimony, due to its focus on resolving problems through communication between a therapist and their patient, rather than on the formation of true beliefs. Since testimonies in psychotherapy do not necessarily lead to the kind of true beliefs attained through, for example, education, they could be treated as a deviation from classical testimonies, but not as the «pathology» of testimony. Given that truth is not the final aim of testimonies in psychotherapy, should we wonder whether a psychotherapeutic encounter that doesn't strive towards truth deviates from usual testimonies in a manner similar to that of, for example, a lie? Undoubtedly, psychotherapeutic encounters are not about transmitting propositional knowledge from one person to another, but rather about conveying beliefs, lived experiences, emotional responses and even personal imaginings. We could state that a psychotherapeutic communicative act involves the transmission of immediately available subjective beliefs such as personal mental states. It seems commonsensical to assume that everyone can be a reliable source of such beliefs. If the very definition of a testimony makes it epistemically valuable for the listener, that is, if a communicative act has to comply with its epistemic duty of providing a source of true and justified beliefs in order to be considered a testimony, then psychotherapeutic encounters in which true beliefs are based on the patient's true account of their immediate experience ought to be regarded as representative examples of testimonies. However, the psychotherapeutic context often provides us with testimonies that cannot be considered true beliefs. This is best illustrated by delusions, or untrue beliefs about external reality, such as reliance on scientifically unproven methods of treating malign illnesses or intense states of grief when a person who has undergone personal loss believes that they can still communicate with their loved one. Such a patient perceives their experience as true despite lacking the epistemic competence of recognizing truth. However, the patient is not lying. In other words, since their words cannot be disqualified as a lie, it would be inaccurate to speak of a proper "pathology of testimony" ( Coady, 2006.) . Not even the therapist taking part in a psychotherapeutic communicative act has to regard truth as the ultimate aim of the testimony. As already mentioned, the fact that the beliefs expressed by the therapist can determine the outcome of therapy compels the therapist to direct their behavior towards the patient's welfare, rather than towards mere truth. However, it is important to note that, in order to achieve mutual trust, the patient must want to honestly convey their experience and the therapist must want to openly understand it. In either case, both parties act as epistemically responsible participants of a communicative act. Therefore, although a psychotherapeutic encounter can be defined as a certain deviation from exemplary testimonies or paradigmatic communicative acts, it possesses considerable epistemic value. Despite the psychotherapist's liberty to use their imagination in order to reach the defined therapeutic aims 27 , the therapist's choice of words is deliberately attuned to the patient's rules of rationality and coherence in order to make their statements comprehensible within the patient's mental framework. This provides the basis for assessing the epistemic competence of the psychotherapist. Recollecting Coady's description of lying within a testimony as a "pathological intention", the psychotherapist's intention cannot be disregarded as "pathological" in being epistemically irresponsible deliberate deception (Coady, 2006.) . The psychotherapist is not deceiving the patient, but rather using the rules of dialogue defined by the psychiatric profession in order to enable the patient to appropriately respond to their claims. A psychotherapeutic communicative act leaves no room for lying and deliberate deceptions, from either the therapist's or the patient's side, as the patient strives to honestly convey information and the therapist aims to fulfill therapeutic goals. The psychotherapist strives to simultaneously provide the patient with so-called functional beliefs or beliefs capable of resolving their problem and address the formal demands of preserving the patient's autonomy, self-confidence and self-respect, thus expanding their perceived personal freedom.
We may relate this to Prijić-Samaržija and Vidmar's inquiry (Prijić-Samaržija, Vidmar, 2012.) about the potential fictionality of a testimony whose author does not intend to convey the truth, "but to make the audience imagine possible situations or sequences of events, thus making the reader's attitude towards fiction more akin to imagination than belief…the fact that a work is fictional does not discount the truthfulness of its contents" (Ibid, pg.69) . It is important to approach the relationship between imagining and believing by taking into account the audience's different attitudes towards fictional and non-fictional content. Therefore, "when speaking of non-fiction, the audience expects true information or an account of the world that they can consider true. In the case of fiction, the audience accepts the presented content while remaining fully aware that its main aim is to fulfill, generally speaking, artistic goals (Ibid, pg.69)". 27 The case known as "The February Man" describes a successful therapeutic hypnosis of a pregnant woman who feared being a bad mother due to negative childhood experiences of parental neglect. Having put her in a state of somnambulistic trance, Milton Erickson introduced himself into her memories in the shape of February Man, an imaginary friend of her father. He created a consistent false memory by encouraging associations between the trance and the patient's genuine experiences. As a result, the patient could discuss her traumatic experiences with her father's friend and approach them from a fresh perspective. This enabled her to confront the fears which drove her to seek therapy. (Erickson and Rossi, 1979) . Encouraging a patient to visualize a version of themselves that has already reached the therapeutic aims of, for example, self-confidence and tranquility, by describing an appropriate future narrative, is a common psychotherapeutic procedure based on the fact that the very act of imagining oneself as, for example, self-confident and tranquil, can produce feelings of selfconfidence and tranquility, thus making them seem as a realistic prospect 28 . Despite the fact that such a narrative cannot be considered a transfer of current truths due to its dependence on imagining and reference to the future, its therapeutic effect is derived from acknowledging true information about the patient, their social circumstances and the likelihood of achieving therapeutic aims. The psychotherapist's testimony must have the qualities of conscientiousness, rationality and coherence. A patient's testimony of their personal experiences is comparably truthful in their desire not to deceive the therapist. The achievement of therapeutic goals always necessitates a certain change to the patient's selfperception. We can therefore conclude that the epistemic responsibility of neither the psychotherapist nor the patient can be considered compromised in a manner similar to
Coady's description of pathologies (Ibid). The psychotherapist is obliged to satisfy the epistemic criteria of clarity, consistency and compliance with the patient's epistemic habits, and is required to possess epistemic competence proportional to the statements offered during the psychotherapeutic encounter. In that sense, we might call for some kind of epistemic justification of the psychotherapist's claims.
Furthermore, it is extremely important to emphasize that a valid psychotherapeutic communicative act cannot include the intention of either the psychotherapist or the patient to misrepresent a falsehood as a truth, or the desire to ascribe epistemic justification to an unjustified claim. We can therefore conclude that a psychotherapeutic communicative act is not an example of a pathological misuse of testimony, unlike Coady's description of deliberately misrepresented lies as "pathologies".
Given that Prijić-Samaržija and Vidmar's account has shown us that the epistemic benefit of forming true beliefs isn't the key criterion of distinguishing nonpathological from pathological testimonies, a testimony expressed during a psychotherapeutic communicative act remains epistemically valuable despite deviating from traditional testimonies (Prijić-Samaržija, Vidmar, 2012.) . It is essential for the patient to benefit from the exchange by forming beliefs about themselves/external reality capable of leading to psychotherapeutic goals. This can undoubtedly be considered the epistemic value of such testimonies. Namely, a psychotherapeutic communicative act is unique in the patient's intention to change their current state by engaging in dialogue with their therapist. It is reasonable to assume that the patient hopes for the therapeutic dialogue to alter their current beliefs and produce better future beliefs. The patient listens to their therapist's statements, claims and beliefs with the hope that some of them may inspire a change in their own beliefs.
It is irrelevant whether these beliefs refer to the patient's self-perception or their account of external reality. The patient engages in therapy lacking a certain belief p, defines it as a therapeutic goal and believes that therapy may allow them to attain the belief p. For example, a patient can opt for therapy due to feelings of misery and inadequacy or a belief that they do not deserve to enjoy their life. They simultaneously believe that these beliefs can be altered in some yet unknown manner that will later allow them to feel more deserving of joy. The latter belief might have been encouraged by hearing positive feedback from earlier patients, trusting the authority of psychotherapists or various other personal attitudes towards psychotherapy.
These reasons might cause them to believe that, despite the fact that they do not currently believe p, they are capable of believing p within a year. In that sense, the patient trusts the psychotherapist to be a reliable, credible and responsible epistemic source of their future belief p. The willingness to alter one's beliefs is also an epistemic virtue.
We can therefore conclude that a psychotherapeutic communicative act is not a pathology of testimony, but that it deviates from traditional communication in not evaluating We have attempted to show that, even though the value turn in epistemology and the introduction of virtue epistemology have enabled the expansion of epistemic evaluation beyond the scope of exchanges of true beliefs, they have managed to maintain its significant epistemic value and focus on epistemic benefits. Likewise, hermeneutical psychotherapy has proven to be the optimal framework for implementing this kind of epistemological evaluation.
While the objectivist approach reflects the traditional epistemic focus on a monist account of truth, the hermeneutic approach perfectly corresponds to virtue epistemology. Moreover, we hold that the hermeneutic approach is not only epistemically justified within this new system of epistemic evaluation, but is also more likely to result in successful psychotherapy
Conclusion
The expansion of the scope of epistemological topics was partially caused by a value turn which has enabled epistemological discussions to surpass the narrowly set framework of analyzing the concept of knowledge and the necessary conditions of its acquisition. Amongst other projects which have emerged from these new epistemological tendencies, the approach of virtue epistemology offered a theoretical and normative framework for the epistemic evaluation of various epistemic processes and activities (which had previously been entirely beyond the scope of epistemological focus). Communicative acts, such as the dialogue between a psychiatrist/psychologist and their patient, had previously been entirely exempt from any sort of epistemological analysis and were only assessed by narrow research within the psychiatric scientific community. Once virtue epistemology had shifted its focus to the intellectual virtues of epistemic agents (rather than the truth-value of the proposition), all communicative acts and their participants became legitimate objects of evaluation: their epistemic success was now measured in terms of virtues such as epistemic responsibility, intellectual consciousness and openness, self-reflexivity, and sensitivity to stereotypes, prejudice and unjustified generalizations. We have attempted to show that the epistemic success of a communicative act between a psychiatrist/psychotherapist and their patient lies in the therapist's epistemically responsible attitude towards the patient's problems, or, more precisely, their epistemically just avoidance of socially produced stereotypes and prejudice.
Our attitude was largely influenced by recent discussions within the philosophy of psychiatry, such as the newly introduced concept of hermeneutical psychotherapy. These discussions have underlined the difficulty (or sheer unlikelihood) of defining what is true in psychiatry/psychotherapy due to the absence of an uncontroversial, objective or fully factual basis for diagnosing mental disorders.
Along these lines, we have attempted to illustrate the relevance of applying epistemology to concrete issues and to show that it can provide a normative framework and terminological foundation for evaluating highly specific epistemic processes 29 . Having opted for virtue epistemology as the normative framework of evaluating the epistemic benefits of psychotherapy, we have demonstrated that the objectivistic approach to psychotherapy cannot be considered a suitable basis of effective psychotherapeutic practice due to its potentially detrimental and counter-productive effects. Conversely, the hermeneutical approach caters to the development of mutual understanding between the therapist and their patient and increases the likelihood of achieving all defined psychotherapeutic aims. 29 Refer to Bishop and Trout 2005. 
